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I must begin with apologies for venturing to talk in an area where
so much has already been written by such notable scholars.' My justifications, if any, are two. In the first place there is one aspect of the
matter which seems vital to me, and which, while it has not gone
unnoticed, seems to me by no means to have been adequately stated
and stressed. I propose to try to supply this need. In the second
place, I think the topic is one that can scarcely be talked about too
much. Legislation has already passed in Pennsylvania, Massachusetts,
Connecticut and perhaps elsewhere. It is doubtless being proposed in
other states, and if not, I am sure it soon will be. And it should be
fought. It should be repealed in Pennsylvania and forestalled elsewhere.
A note on history. It is said to repeat itself. And jurisdictions
that have modified the common-law rule by. statute have usually not
been happy with the result. Half a dozen have repealed their legislation
and gone back to the common-law rule. New York has not but should;
their experiment has been a public scandal. Some states have gone
back to the common-law rule in fact, if not in theory, by judicial perversions of the statute.
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This suggests that too hasty action is risky. Pennsylvania was
the first to venture into the area of wait-and-see. Mr. Leach, the
great protagonist of wait-and-see, cheers the Pennsylvania legislators
as hardy pioneers. "Oh pioneers" apostrophised Walt Whitman, and
Leach goes along. Yet I suspect that hardy pioneers may not be quite
what the doctor ordered in this area; there are reasons to think they
acted too hardily and too hastily. I have said that the legislation
should be repealed; if I may, I will publicly go on record as predicting
that it will be. (Though this is probably safe enough, as I doubt that
I live to see the outcome.)
The first question I would like to throw out is: Is the common-law
rule really working so badly? Mr. Leach is a property teacher; they
are, by common repute, a conservative folk. Yet, much as I respect
him, I have to say that in his crusading he has employed some rather
intemperate language. If a use of the pathetic fallacy may be pardoned,
I cannot help enjoying the thought of how the entrails of the venerable
Law QuarterlyReview must have quivered as it gave birth to an article
entitled: "Staying the Slaughter of the Innocents." In the less prim
HarvardLaw Review the article appeared under the name of "Ending
the Rule's Reign of Terror."
Be that as it may, has there really been a reign of terror, a slaughter
of the innocents? I doubt it. For one thing, I think if such a charge
could be documented, Mr. Leach would have done it. If I am not
mistaken, in none of his articles has he collected authorities tending to
show that any very great number of wills have currently been the
innocent victims of the rule. I have not counted noses (if cases have
noses) and I do not assume to set myself up as an authority, but I have
been browsing through advance sheets and reading perpetuities cases
for quite a number of years and it is not my impression that the casualty
rate is high. Mr. Waterbury, who has written a brilliant article on this
subject,' has some figures. If I do not misread him, they suggest that
in these United States there are not more than three or four casualties
a year. Double that, if you like; it's still a trifle. After all, the sea of
future interests is a stormy one. Every year many good barks founder
on such rocks as class gifts, divide and pay over, vesting, gifts to issue,
gifts to survivors, and so on and so on.
Perhaps I may be pardoned if I quote a verse. It is from the
Greek Anthology, and has long been a favorite of mine, though I had
not until recently thought of it as bearing upon future interests. It
goes:
2. See note 1 supra.
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"A sailor shipwrecked on this coast
Bids you: Take sail!
Full many a gallant ship, when we were lost
Weathered the gale."
"Full many a gallant ship!" who had a competent skipper at the
helm, a competent draftsman. It's the ships that go down that get the
publicity. We all remember the Titanic-and the Hesperus. We don't
think of the Minnie K. Jones, of New Bedford, that's been sailing the
seven seas safely for fifty years. It's the bad wills a lawyer draws that
turn up in casebooks. Anyhow, the point I am trying to make is that
I do not think an undue proportion of these frustrations are the result
of the rule. It has a bad name and gets bad publicity. Its victims are,
I think, more conspicuous, but not really more common-probably less
common-than the other victims of poor draftsmanship. Indeed Mr.
Leach's own criticism of the rule amounts to little more than reiterated
castigation of a few freak cases which he has popularized by giving
them cute names: "The Fertile Octogenarian," "The Precocious
Toddler," "The Magic Gravel Pit" and so on.
This suggests to me an interesting point of psychology. Rules,
limiting the effectiveness of human activity because of supposed considerations of public policy, are always unpopular. It is always considered a tragedy when they operate. I started to say "fulfill their
purpose"-but for some reason that is never the attitude. Consider
the Statute of Frauds, which supposes, perhaps foolishly, that certain
transactions are so risky that they should not be tolerated unless put
into writing. Does anyone remember reading a case in which the
court says: "It is a pleasure, in the public interest, to hold that this
attempt to create a trust-or contract-or will-must fail for failure
to comply with the formalities imposed by the statute? Some scoundrel"
-the court continues-"trying to evade the law ?" No. Definitely no.
Invariably the court says the statute should be a shield and not a sword,
and strains everything to find some way to "take the case out" of the
Statute of Frauds.
And so it is with the Rule Against Perpetuities. When a limitation
is voided thereby, it is deemed a tragedy. Another innocent slaughtered.
"One more unfortunate . . . gone to her death." That is not from
the Greek Anthology but from Tom Hood. I am surprised that Mr.
Leach has not quoted it. Who remembers a court saying: "This is a
shocking attempt to postpone the vesting of the remainders to a point
prohibited by the rule?" Who indeed? Observe this. Numerous plans
for amending the rule have been proposed lately-all in favor of making
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the rule more liberal, or preventing it from operating. Not within
living memory has the proposal been made to make the rule more strict.
If no one wants the rule enforced, why amend it? Is it just a noble
experiment-like another one of dismal memory? Why not simply
abandon it?
I don't know, frankly, whether I make that proposal seriously or
not. People can make plenty of foolish provisions within the rule; any
good draftsman can tie up property validly for many years and with
no good reason shown. So the rule doesn't conspicuously stand in the
way of unsocial people with good lawyers. On the other hand, it is
my impression-again, I admit, not based on statistics-that very few
palpably foolish limitations come up for litigation. Would it be
absurd to abandon any rule?
That is an extraordinary difficult question. The difficulty perhaps
stems from the fact that our sense of the need for a rule is based largely
on an abstraction. We all have, as part of our intellectual inheritance,
a feeling that there is something wrong in permitting testators to control
to a remote period the devolution of their property. The dead hand,
we are likely to say. It is undesirable, unsocial. The world-and
particularly its goods-is for the living and not the dead. If we consider the reasons which, from Hume and Grotius and Locke on, have
been considered to justify the process of testation, it is clear that none
of them have much to say for allowing a man to leave his property to
those who shall be his heirs in 2159.
But suppose we ask the sober, practical question: what is the harm
of it? And to whom? We say: the law should not allow people to do
preposterous things with their property. Perhaps not. But it does.
Every year the law permits hundreds of testators to do capricious,
prejudiced, cruel things to those who have reasonable claims on their
bounty. In this great Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, a widower with
crippled, incompetent, or otherwise helpless children, can leave all his
property to his girl friend, his dog, or the Society of Philatelists.'
Would it be any worse if he were allowed to leave it to his heirs as of
2159?
It is sometimes said that the purpose of a rule against perpetuities
is to keep property in commerce. This may have been convincing in
an era of legal estates, present and in remainder, but today's typical will
leaves property in trust. And the typical trust corpus is securities.
Ordinarily the trust company (today's typical trustee) will have ample
3. This is, of course, subject to the small and temporary relief provided by the
family exemption. See §§ 320211-.216 of the Fiduciaries Act of 1949, PA. STAT.
AxN. tit. 20, § 320.101 (1950).
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powers to change investments, to sell securities and buy new ones, and
so on. Is there more threat here to the mobility of property than
inheres in the fact (well known) that insurance companies, investment
trusts and the like hold so many billion dollars worth of securities in
their portfolios, that the supply available to the individual investor is
becoming limited?
Mr. Waterbury, whose work in this area I so much admire, seems
to put the need for a rule on the right of T's heirs to get their hands on
his property without too long a delay. Regretfully, I cannot find much
merit in this. It seems out of keeping in a society which otherwise
allows testators so much leeway. If we were dealing with a provision
for long accumulation, it would be easier to find objections. The
chief consideration against any liberty of testation-namely that it puts
property into the hands of those who have not earned it, have done
nothing to deserve it, and presumptively have no special capacity to
handle it wisely-is certainly magnified as the amount of property
involved is magnified. But the testator's heirs in 2159 are not likely
to get more than he left in 1959; perhaps, considering the cost of
trusteeship and the wear and tear caused by the cycle of depression and
inflation, they are likely to get less.
In sum, I am not able to give much reason for the slight prejudice
I have-and I suspect many of us have. Maybe the best reason one can
see for a rule against perpetuities is that if we don't have one, some
testator one day will outdo himself in folly, make a will to end all wills,
and the outraged court will declare that it cannot be tolerated, and that
all estates must vest within a period.

.

.

. In short, we will start all

over again with a new rule against perpetuities and some new Barton
Leach, yet unborn, will try to rescue us from it by dreaming up a rule
of wait-and-see.
Or let us consider something a little different. T leaves his estate
to his children, grandchildren and great grandchildren for successive
lives, then to his Brother Bill in fee. The life estate to grandchildren
at least is good; though that to great grandchildren is probably bad;
the gift to Bill is good because it is presently vested. Bill won't take
in possession, however, until the grandchildren are dead. How much
is BilFs interest worth in the meantime? It is not like a long term
lease; there is no rent and no known time of termination. Bill will
almost certainly be dead; it may be his great grandchildren who ultimately get to use the property. Is this any more wholesome, socially
speaking, than it would be to let T leave his estate to his own great
grandchildren? Yet it is valid, because our rule is framed in terms of
vesting.
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I am suggesting here in passing that there is a school of thought,
including conspicuously my learned brothers Simes 4 and Schuyler,5
who, if I understand them right, think that any rule of perpetuities
should be framed in terms of vesting in enjoyment rather than vesting
in interest. I do not propose to argue this here; it is not within my
competence or my topic. I only suggest that considering the history
of legislation, and the tendency of bad legislation to preclude good,
consideration of possible action should include not only the perhaps
fantastic idea of repealing the rule entirely, but also of adopting not
some makeshift like wait-and-see, but an act framed in terms of vesting
in enjoyment.
Very well. After this perhaps too extended introduction, let us
now proceed to "wait-and-see." You are all familiar with the idea,
but to be on the safe side I quote the basic provision in the Pennsylvania
statute. It reads:
"Upon the expiration of the period allowed by the common
law rule against perpetuities as measured by actual rather than
possible events, any interest not then vested and any interest in
members of a class the membership of which is then subject to
increase shall be void." 6
This has a very plausible sound. Surely, the unwary are likely to
say, this is just the good old common-law rule, with its worst feature
neatly eliminated. The supposed bad feature, I need hardly say, is the occasion of a remainder or executory interest being declared void because
of the possibilitythat it will not vest within the period allowed by the rule
-although, as it turns out, it vests in fact well within the period. Suppose, for example, in the case of a gift to T's great grandchildren reaching twenty-one, bad at common law because of the possibility T's children might have more children, it turned out that all the grandchildren
ever born were alive at T's death, so that in fact the great grandchildren reached twenty-one within twenty-one years after the termination of lives in being. This certainly happens in a considerable proportion of cases. It must have happened, for example, in the famous case of
John and Elizabeth Jee, 7 who were seventy when T died.
Such cases infuriate Mr. Leach and many other learned students
of the rule. If they are right in being infuriated, obviously something
should be done about the situation. What more natural than to wait
4. See note 1 supra.
5. Ibid.
6. PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 20, § 301.4(b) (1950).
7. Jee v. Audley, Cox 324, 29 Eng. Rep. 1186 (Eq. 1787).
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and see and hold the remainder or executory interest valid if in fact it
vests within a life and twenty-one years?
This is the proposal. The assumption on which it rests is the
crux of the matter. I venture to consider the assumption, and, ergo,
the proposal, unsound. I am not infuriated, or mildly disturbed, at
the case of T's great grandchildren. It seems to be no more shocking
than that a court should refuse to probate an unsigned will. I am not
even really much horrified-and no foolish mortal ever made a greater
admission-by Jee v. Audley.8
The proposition I assert is that in the light of the purpose and
philosophy of the rule-the policy intended to be subserved-it is quite
irrelevant when the remainder in fact vests. To borrow an illustration
from Mr. Simes, it is as irrelevant as the question whether the legatee
to whom property is left on condition that he divorce--or choke-his
wife, does in fact do so.
To give myself a framework, and, I hope, to clarify matters, let me
amplify and subdivide the assertion just made. More specifically, the
propositions I assert and will attempt to defend are two: First, that
both by the spirit and sense of the rule, it is and should be utterly
irrelevant when the interest vests in fact, and, second, that if we completely pervert the sense and intent of the rule, making it turn on the
time when the remainder actually vests, then the period allowed by the
common-law rule becomes meaningless and absurd, and some different
one should be adopted.
Perhaps I can begin best by really going back to fundamentals.
Suppose we were to set ourselves to frame a rule against remoteness.
Of course we know the rule was not made all at once. Lord Nottingham, who usually gets the credit for it, only started it. But suppose
we start out on the assumption that it is unhealthy, socially speaking,
to' allow the vesting of estates to be postponed too far into the future,
how can we best proceed? There are two alternative procedures that
are obvious (though I don't say there might not be more). One is to
set a period and say: if the remainder doesn't vest in that time, we'll call
it void. Fifty years-the life of good Queen Bess-it doesn't matter
for the moment. Although I should think some one would say: you
mean we have to wait for some period of perhaps many years before
we know ? How extremely inconvenient! But more of that, later.
That is one approach. Set a time limit and wait to see if the
remainder qualifies. Don't decide your horse race on the basis of
which horse is the best and most likely to win; wait and see which one
8. Ibid.
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does win, then pay off the lucky gamblers. This is certainly good
sense, horse-race-wise.
The other approach says: we are, after all, not engaged in gambling. It is T's privilege to make remainders contingent and it is often
desirable to do so to preserve the maximum flexibility in estate planning;
it does not follow that if and as they vest, the law should make their
validity depend on quite fortuitous circumstances. As in many other
cases involving policy, our purpose is prophylactic. A formula is
needed by which it can be determined whether a given limitation is
undesirable as likely to delay vesting too long. This will permit immediate decision on the validity of the limitation, something often-if
not usually-of vital importance to the parties. If a reasonable formula
is worked out, testators can allow for and respect it. They will not
be unduly hampered and there will be no disappointed expectation, as
long as wills are well drawn. Here I hear Mr. Leach muttering: "Anyone who thought that, was soon disillusioned !" Of course, I have just
been lamenting in poetry-not my own-how often wills are not well
drawn. A little later we can consider the question: assuming certain
simple modifications to be made in the common-law rule, will wait-andsee be any more merciful to the ignorant or badly-advised testator?
Everything depends of course on finding a formula that is fair
and workable, that neither hampers testators unduly nor tolerates
limitations having a marked tendency to perpetuity. And the commonlaw rule as finally worked out, to some extent, commends itself. I say
to some extent; I do not wish to seem to take the position that the rule
is perfect. But it permits a T to make what is not only a reasonable
but a natural limitation-to some life tenant, and then to a remainderman who has attained majority. This looks after children, it looks
after grandchildren, it can look after great grandchildren, if T's children
are dead and he naturally thinks in terms of great grandchildren and
their issue. Of course, when the rule was framed, it was a feat just
to reach twenty-one; that probably seemed plenty. With the increase
in life expectancies it may seem to us that the period of minority, at
least for this purpose, could well be extended to twenty-five or thirty
years. Well and good; a statute could readily make such a modification
in the rule without altering its essential nature.
The point is that for a rule conceived prospectively, like the rule
against encouraging divorce, or the automobile speed limit, and designed
to make a formula for testators to live-or die-by, the period of the
rule works very well. What else could you do? What sense would a
period in gross make? "Remainders must be limited so as to surely
vest in fifty years." This doesn't fit testamentary thinking. A rule to
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operate prospectively must fit the facts of life, it must be in terms of
normal, expectable events.
"To my wife for life and then to my issue in successive life estates,
per stirpes, but at the expiration of fifty years from my death, all
life estates save that of my wife to terminate and the remainder to
vest in my then living issue per capita."
This, I submit, is possible but not sensible. It does not fit the
thinking nor the needs of a testator. What in the world, T will say to
his attorney; how in the world can you provide for things in terms of
fifty years? Tell me: can I leave it to my children, my grandchildren,
my great grandchildren? Can I keep it from them until they are thirty?
And so on.
If, on the other hand, we wait and see, and say that remainders are
good only if they in fact vest within a certain time, then the common-law
formula makes little sense. Why? Because lives vary so. They are
like the Chancellor's foot, some long, some all too brief. And a public
policy that is really concerned with how long it is before the remainders
actually vest ought to set the same time for everybody; it surely cannot
be satisfied with a rule that turns on how long it is before dear old
Uncle Jim obliges by having a heart attack. The possibilities are
fantastic. As I shall presently illustrate, the permissible period could
turn out to vary from twenty-six to 102 (perhaps more, if we find the
right lives).
So it appears plain, at least to me, that a formula in terms of lives
in being and minority, necessarily pre-supposes a determination in
terms of possibilities-and makes no sense on any other supposition.
Shall we say: five yard penalty for off-side? Or shall we say: let's wait
and see how much the opposition was hurt by the off-side and figure a
penalty on that basis? Any football fan can answer that one. If, on
the other hand, we are to wait and see, it appears equally plain that
some other type of formula is called for, one that is definite, that is the
same for everyone; perhaps one in terms of so many years. And
hence my assertion, which may have seemed surprising, that the
common-law rule really doesn't care when the estates vest, whether soon
or late; it is satisfied if a formula is followed which by and large
renders unlikely any great number of objectionable perpetuities.
Think of the hundreds of wills defeated because the T didn't know
that two witnesses were required or that they must attest in his presence
or that he must declare to them that the instrument is his will. Some
of these requirements are palpably foolish and should be repealed, as I
have pointed out elsewhere, but there are few to assert that statutes of
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wills should be abolished and that we should ask courts to determine
a man's last wishes on the basis of what he told his friends over the last
twenty years of his life, or on his deathbed. The purpose of a wills act is
to provide a formula which by and large will safeguard the testamentary
process. I am convinced that the spirit of the common-law Rule
Against Perpetuities was the same, and that it is foreign to it to ask
how long it really was before a particular estate vested.
Thus, if I am right, wait-and-see is not a modification or improvement of the common-law rule; it is something new and different, but
not better. It is inconsistent with itself. It applies the common-law
formula only in a context where it makes no sense.
Let us consider particular aspects of the new look in perpetuities.
For one thing it will presumably not be applied, in spite of the statute,
in certain types of cases. This is called "wait-and-see" legislationbut is it always? Often? To repeat, the Pennsylvania statute provide6
that "upon the expiration of the period . . . as measured by actual
rather than possible events, any interest not then vested . .
shall

be void." What does this contemplate in the case of a limitation whose
validity or invalidity is definite from the beginning? Suppose, for
example, a limitation to "my issue per stirpes as of twenty-two years
after my death." Or suppose the same but with the period specified
as "twenty years after my death." It is clear that the first provision
is bad and the second one good. Nothing can change twenty-two years
into twenty-one nor twenty into twenty-two. (Except perhaps Mr.
Chief Justice Doe.) Since no lives are involved, the time of vesting
is determined solely by the number of years mentioned. Hence, the
period allowed by the common-law rule is twenty-one years and no
more. The statute bids us wait until the expiration of this period as
measured by actual events. There are, however, no actual events conceivably having any bearing on the problem-unless we assume some
atom-caused alteration -in the solar system. If we wait patiently until
the end of twenty-one years, we then simply know what we have known
all along, that the interest limited to the class of issue by the very
terms of the twenty-two year limitation has not and could not have
vested. By the same approach in the case of the twenty-year postponement we know in advance that the interest-assuming it ever vestswill have vested, and could not have failed to vest, within the period.
What does the statute intend us to do in these cases? Wait and see?
For what? Surely not to wait twenty-one years to discover something
which has been positively known from the start. There seems only one
possible conclusion, namely, to treat -the matter as determined as of
the time the instrument goes into effect. If so, we are back in the
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common-law rule and it seems inconceivable that a court would not
decide the issue presently if anyone wished to raise it. And probably
someone would so raise it. Experience shows that often limitations
whose validity or invalidity is perfectly apparent to even the half-skilled
eye, are vigorously challenged or defended, as the case may be, and
carried to the highest court at substantial expense to all concerned. A
fortiori, this will be true in the case of a statute whose meaning is not
known to anyone as of now, and which will probably puzzle courts
considerably when they come to construe it.
This is not important save as showing that all will not be waitand-see; possibilities cannot be completely exorcised. And it may perhaps suggest what some will regard as a meritorious aspect of the new
legislation: namely, that the law will not be changed as to well-drafted
limitations but that testators who have recklessly or ignorantly drawn
doubtful provisions will have a gambler's chance that they may be valid.
Precisely-if a gamble is what you want! That is the question to which
I immediately address myself.
Let me put a simple illustration. And let me apologize for repeating things which are no doubt fully understood by many of you, but
which may not beby some. In my experience the subject of perpetuities
is not one that is expertly understood by all lawyers. (I hope I
shall not be guilty of making any other such gross understatements!)
Let us assume a testator, a middle aged man, with a wife and no
children, and a brother to whom he is very much attached. He leaves
his property in trust, to his wife for life and then to his brother's
children who reach twenty-five. The unfortunate provision limiting the
gift to children who reach twenty-five may be the result of the brother's
already having children who do not currently appear to be too thrifty,
or perhaps just to the testator's general (and not uncommon) conviction
that no children should be trusted with property until they are at least
twenty-five.
The provision for children is totally void under the common-law
rule. There are no if's about it, no but's, no waiting and seeing. The
reason is simple. The brother, being alive, is legally presumed-and
may well actually be--capable of having more children. And hence
it is perfectly possible that some or all of the children who reach twentyfive may not do so until more than twenty-one years after the brother's
death. For example, if -the brother dies leaving a son aged one, that
child, if it ever reaches twenty-five, will not do so until twenty-four
years after the death of his parent. That obviously is more than
twenty-one.
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If I were in the classroom some student would be sure to ask,
"Does that mean that the brother is the life in being?". My answer
would probably be that there is no the life in being, but that the rule
requires that there be some life in the picture so related to the limitation
that it is absolutely certain that, if the takers ever qualify, they will
do so within twenty-one years after the termination of this life. Perhaps it will be useful by way of explanation to add this comment. Had
our testator made the gift to children who reach twenty-one, everything
would have been lovely. The brother's children by the laws of nature
are bound to be born (or at least conceived, which the law treats as
just as good for this purpose) at his death and hence cannot fail to
reach twenty-one within twenty-one years thereafter. Incidentally, I
might remark that there are two simple legislative amendments of the
common-law rule which would take the bugs out of this all too familiar
type of will. One would set a limit, say fifty or fifty-five, after which a
female is conclusively presumed to be incapable of having children.
This would end the disturbing absurdity (or so most people think)
illustrated by the famous case of Jee v. Audley where a gift was bad
because of the possibility that a couple "of a very advanced age" (in
fact, seventy) might have more children. The other would set a greater
term in gross, say twenty-five or even thirty, and perhaps also provide
for a kind of cy-pr6s interpretation of the age provision, permitting the
court to reduce it to the newly-established maximum, if necessary, to
save the gift.
However, our new-fangled legislation does not proceed along these
lines. On the expiration of the common-law period "any interests not
then vested shall be void." The meaning of this is apparently that we
wait for the life to elapse, and for twenty-one years afterwards, and
then strike down any interests not yet vested as void. At this point
my students would ask, "What life?" and I would be floored because no
one yet knows the answer to that question-but again, more of that
later.
To make the point I am trying to make, a little more vividly, let us
assume that our testator has two brothers, A and B, and that he leaves
(after the life estate to his wife) half to the children of A who reach
twenty-five and the other half to the children of B who reach twentyfive. Brother A dies a year later, leaving a newborn daughter. As
pointed out earlier, we don't really have to wait and see, but, if we do,
the poor child will reach twenty-five twenty-five years thereafter, and
her gift will be void.' Thus a gift vesting in twenty-six years is bad
9. This assumes a common-law approach to possible lives in being. Whether
the possibilities are increased under wait-and-see legislation is discussed in text
beginning second paragraph following note 11 infra.
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under the new legislation as a perpetuity. A short perpetuity soon
curried, may we say.
Brother B, on the other hand, is the hearty type. Forty years
later a first son is born. Brother B does not die of the shock, but
lives another ten years, so the son reaches twenty-five only fifteen years
after the father's death. Hence the gift to B's children, although not
vesting for sixty-five years, turns out to be perfectly valid under the
new legislation. Thus we reach the result which to me, at least, seems
anomalous-I could use a stronger word-that the gift vesting in
twenty-six years is bad and the gift vesting in sixty-five years is good.
Two gifts in the same will, in the same terms. One fails for remoteness
in twenty-six years; the other flourishes-shall we say for "propinquity"-after sixty-five. Is this fair, is this sensible, is this due process?
The question will be asked "Is this not better than having both
gifts doomed from the start as under the common-law rule?"
That is a fair and reasonable question. I think, however, the
answer I would give is quite obvious. No-unless you want a
gambling rule, based on circumstances purely fortuitous, having no
apparent relevance to the public interest and not operating in the same
way in all cases. If there is a need for a Rule Against Perpetuitieswhich I have ventured to cast some doubt on-and if the rule as framed
is a reasonable one, we should not speak in terms of "doom" if it does
operate. Subject to the suggestion made above that modern conditions
would make appropriate an extension of the period of years to twentyfive or perhaps even thirty, it seems to me a reasonable and fair rule.
(Of course under the suggested amendment, both limitations would be
quite valid.) I do not remember hearing a more reasonable rule
proposed. I should be happy to hear one, and espouse it-if convinced
that it really is more reasonable.
If your patience with these abstractions is not exhausted, let me
give one more illustration of the operation of the statute; at least let me
try to, since the case I suppose is to me not completely translucent under
the language of the act. Same limitation: W for life, then to the
children of B who reach twenty-five. T dies, leaving W, and B, who
as yet has no children. W dies. (A fact, I think, of no significance.)
No one is now entitled to income; it goes to the heirs. (Nothing, I
assume, in the statute changes this. And if unfortunate, it is T's fault,
not that of the statute.) Now B dies, leaving three children, one ten,
one five, and the youngest, one.
Let us re-examine the statute, in the light of this situation. The
gift to children is plainly a class gift. At the end of the common-law
period-measured by actual events, so the statute says-"any interest
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in members of a class the membership of which is then subject to increase shall be void." The class is obviously subject to increase, since
no child is yet twenty-five. The period is twenty-one years from B's
death, since he is the only relevant life. Until all three children have
either reached twenty-five or died, the class is subject to increase, since
it includes all who reach twenty-five. (It can of course include no other
children, since B is dead and can have no more-but this is irrelevant to
our problem.)
Now observe, carefully. I should roll up my sleeves at this point.
This is where I pull the rabbit out of the hat. The two older children
will meet the test. That is, being five and ten, they will reach twentyfive (if ever) in twenty and fifteen years respectively. That is less
than the twenty-one allowed; it is O.K. But poor little Baby can't
make it. If he lives to reach twenty-five, he won't and can't do it for
twenty-four years. That is too long; the limit is twenty-one. And if
he does, he not only can't take, but he defeats his brothers. Because if
he is alive as the race passes the crucial twenty-one year post, the whole
gift fails. Why? Because Baby being alive, and not yet twenty-five,
the class is still "subject to increase." Hence, the twenty-one years
having elapsed, "any interest in members of a class

.

.

.

shall be

void."
Then what happens, if the one year old disobligingly refuses to die,
to save the gift to his brothers? The statute, under the general caption
"Disposition when invalidity occurs," lists three categories. The first
two are inapplicable, so our case falls into the third: "Any other void
interest shall vest in the person or persons entitled to the income at the
expiration of the period described in section 4(b)." This is to say,
the common-law period measured by actual events. What does this
mean? A learned writer "ohas stated that this means "to the last income beneficiary," but with all respect, I cannot find this in the
statute. W being dead, her life estate is terminated, so she is not
entitled to the income. If she were, it would go to her estate, a result
that would astonish an average testator. No one is entitled to the
income in the sense that it is so limited in the will. Is the heir (T's
father in this instance) entitled to the income? If so, it is only because
all limited interests having expired or been held void, it passes to him
by way of reversion. On this theory he is entitled to the whole business;
it is pointless to say he is entitled to the income. Normally, invalidity
can scarcely occur within a life estate; it will happen twenty-one years
after the termination of one; when it appears that remainders are void,
10. Cohan, supra note 1, at 325.
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there will be no one entitled to income. One wonders at the meaning
intended here.
Observe finally: by ,the rules governing class gifts, perpetuities
aside, the two elder children would qualify as they reach twenty-five
and be each entitled to at least a third. Under the statute the eldest
will qualify, class-wise, six years before the history of the baby will
determine whether he is entitled to any share. What happens to the
property in this period? Class gifts are governed by various rules of
convenience calculated to insure vesting and distribution as soon as
possible. This is now nullified by a conspicuous rule of inconvenience.
Two points will quite conceivably, and I agree quite properly, be
made. One is that, since the rule applies only to contingent interests
in any event, a certain amount of wait-and-see is necessarily involved,
and there is little harm in postponing the determination of the validity
of the interest until the time comes when it is certain that it will vest or
has vested. The second is that under the common law many courts
have exhibited an unwillingness, or perhaps even have refused as a rule,
to determine the validity of an interest until the termination of prior
interests.
To these propositions it seems to me an adequate answer that
there is a strong policy in favor of making possible the determination of
the validity of interests at the earliest possible moment, which in the
case of wills is the death of the testator. There are often excellent
reasons why a T should make contingent limitations. He cannot know,
in many instances, how many grandchildren he will have, let alone how
many will reach twenty-five. Why add to -thisnot particularly cruel uncertainty the hazard that the interest will be held void after parties
have waited years for it to vest? Or they may not have waited; they
may have died.
As to the argument that courts are frequently unwilling to decide at
T's death-and shouldn't-I think that except in Pennsylvania, this is
an exaggeration on the facts. Courts are often lazy and willing to put
off anything that can be put off-but I think any one who reads the
current cases will agree that in a majority of instances courts are willing
to decide such issues presently if anyone insists. It is, for example, an
admirable place for a declaratory judgment, or a petition for instructions. In many cases jurisdiction is taken without discussion as a
matter of course.
It is argued that if the validity of remainders is determined before
the life estate terminates, those whose interests are involved may very
well be minors and have no counsel, so that the matter will be inadequately argued. This is perhaps a valid argument in some connections,
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but it does not appear so here. Under the common-law rule, no facts
are in issue and nothing will or can happen during the life estate that
bears on the issue. The issue is a simple one, although I grant that
even courts do not always find it easy. Does a certain provision of a
will violate a rule susceptible of immediate application? A good court
should have no difficulty in deciding this without much argument and
it is certainly always within the power of the court to have as much
argument as it wishes or needs. Take the case we have been using for
an example. If we assume that the testator has an elderly father who
is his heir at law, it is obvious that under the common-law rule he has
a reversion after the life estate. If this is doubted, there seems every
reason why the matter should be clarified immediately. This will
promote the practical handling of the matter by the wife and father,
probably to the interest of both. The father quite conceivably may
wish to respect his son's wishes, and release his interest to the brother,
or at least effect a settlement. Under wait-and-see it may not be determined for many years or until after the father's death that he was the
heir to valuable property. Under such circumstances it is less likely
that he will make a generous compromise; after his death, his executors
will be powerless to do so.
To this may be added the consideration that a trust is very likely
to be involved. Trust companies are not conspicuously inopes consilii;
they are likely to command the service of very high-bracket legal
advice. Often they will have had a hand in drawing the instrument in
question. That they have a stake-or a number of stakes-in defending
it, is a proposition rather too obvious to need exploration. No, I don't
think we need to be sorry for the contingent remaindermen.
A final word on this point. It is true that in Pennsylvania the
courts have been conspicuously unwilling to make an early determination of validity. Regrettably so, as I see it. My good friend and
colleague, Mr. Philip Br6gy, in an article 1 justifying the new legislation (which he had a hand in framing) does it largely on the basis that
Pennsylvania courts are going to wait-and-see anyhow.
I confess this seems to me inadequate. A bad practice should not
be perpetuated by bad legislation. If the legislation is to be repealed or
modified, as I have prophesied and as I think it surely will be when the
complexities and inadequacies of its operation become apparent, the
legislation must include some provision for the present determination
(preferably by declaratory judgment) of the validity of future estates.
Not to do this would be to effect only a partial cure.
11. Brgy, .-'pra note 1.

1959]

PENNSYLVANIA PERPETUITIES LEGISLATION

If we now turn to my second proposition or assertion, it is by a
somewhat devious route. Let us begin by asking this question: how
are lives in being determined under the new legislation? As I have
already pointed out, under the common-law rule there is not necessarily
any life in being and the question of what life or lives, if any, will
serve is determinable without much difficulty from the relationships
and ages of the parties involved. Thus to repeat the illustration I have
already used, a gift to the brother's children who reach twenty-one is
perfectly valid. Does that rest on the life of the widow? Obviously
not. Her life is quite irrelevant. There is no connection whatever
between the time she dies and the time when the brother's children
will reach twenty-one. On the other hand, since the brother's children
must be born or conceived when he dies, they cannot fail to reach
twenty-one within twenty-one years after his death. Thus he will
serve as the life in being who saves the gift.
How is this under the statute? To make a problem let us go back
to the version limiting the remainder to brother's children who reach
twenty-five. Suppose in fact that the widow is young and tough and
lives fifty years after testator's death. In that time all of the brother's
children have been born and have reached the specified age. Not within
twenty-one years of the death of their father, however, so that way of
escape is out. But within the life of the widow who was alive at
testator's death. May we treat her as the life in being and save the
gifts?
The statute does not answer this question. I am sure that my
average student would say "yes" and defend his answer by saying that
"She is mentioned in the will and so one of the parties involved." If
this is so, would the same be true of the lawyer whom testator expresses
the wish to have employed, or the executor if he happens to be alive,
or the testator's gardener whom the testator cautions as to the care of
the hedge on his estate, and so on? Any number of people may be
mentioned in the will. Is the gift good because it happens that someone
mentioned in the will has obligingly been alive from the testator's
death until the vesting of the gift?
But it will certainly be asked (and to my mind certainly must be
asked) what is the magic in being mentioned? None of the characters
just listed have anything to do with the growth of the brother's family;
it is purely accidental from the standpoint of those children that they
appear in the will.
Finally, if we decide to extend the matter to those mentioned in
the will-not so much because it makes sense as because the statute does
not forbid-why not logically (or at least with equal logic) extend it to
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anyone who is alive when the testator dies and survives to the vesting
of the gift? Thus it will be adequate if the claimant's attorney produces
in court a character with a long grey beard and proves that he is 108
years old, and was alive when T died.
This, I submit, is an absurdity. To my mind, an obvious absurdity.
But there is nothing in either the language or the philosophy of the
statute to prevent!
So I revert to my second proposition: that if we insist on completely perverting the sense and intent of the rule, making it turn on
the time when the remainder actually vests, then the period allowed by
the common-law rule becomes meaningless and irrelevant, and some
different one should be adopted. We have just seen what happened in
the case of T's brothers, A and B. One remainder was void although
it vested in twenty-six years; the other was good, although it did not
vest for sixty-five years. If we are really concerned with the time when
the remainder actually vests, the determination should not rest on such
whimsical considerations. A definite time limit should be set; at least
we will know when validity is to be determined, even if we can't know
what the result will be.
If we are to use a period in gross, how long shall it be? I have no
idea. The proponents of wait-and-see appear not to have been impressed with the impropriety of making actual remoteness turn on something so inherently variable as human life, and so they have not suggested periods in gross. Statistics as to life expectancy don't help much,
since we deal with an infinite variety of lives. Perhaps, if it turns out
that the courts let us use any life, statistics might help. What is the
age of the oldest substantially sizable group of living persons at any
given time? Ninety-five? We should not allow for genuine rareties;
certified centenarians might be hard to find.
So the rule might be that all remainders must vest within ninetyfive years after T's death. What a treat for those who are waiting to
see! A testator by leaving the property for life to his youngest living
heir, ninety-five years from his death, could create a reversion that
might not vest in possession for 150 years. Absurd, I think, and I hope
you agree-but it is where we naturally end up once we start thinking
that validity of contingent remainders should depend on how long it is
before they actually vest.
Let me close by raising briefly this question: how will the statute
affect will-drafting? The proponents of this legislation have advertised
it in such glowing terms that it would not be surprising if the impression prevailed that from now on will-drafting will be fool-proof,
perpetuities-wise. If so, I fear you are doomed to disappointment. It
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is not fool-proof; there are the same pitfalls as always for -the ignorant
or careless draftsman. I imagine that, if prudent, lawyers will (and
should) for at least twenty years to come proceed largely to draft wills
as if the common-law rule were still in force. Obviously any will valid
under the common-law rule will be valid under the statute.
Conceivably, an attorney might be tempted to go beyond existing
practice in two areas. First, there are a number of standard situations
where a will is bad at common law because that law assumes as possible
something which the draftsman knows to be either highly unlikely or in
fact impossible. The administrative contingency. "Two years after the
probate of my will." Or what Mr. Leach has called the fertile octogenarian. If the testator's brother is eighty-seven years old, there is
no harm in limiting a remainder to his children who reach twenty-five
or thirty-five or, if you like, eighty-seven. That manifests a rather
extreme distrust of youth, but will be perfectly valid since we are
reasonably sure that an eighty-seven year old man will not procreate
further, and hence all of the beneficiaries, if any ever meet the test, will
necessarily be children alive at the testator's death and will reach eightyseven, if ever, in their own lives. But why take any chances? Simple
drafting devices, long familiar, will do it without recourse to novel
doctrines. "His children alive at my death," will do it.
The other area is highly speculative. If the courts permit the use
of any life, can this be turned to use, drafting-wise? I doubt it. T
can already specify ten new born female babies from families of conspicuous longevity. This will give him (using the life of the last to die)
a good deal of rope; if he craves more, he may only hang himself. But,
following the statutory principle, as to this we can only wait and see.
So, it all seems to me rather sad. The common-law rule is sound
in conception and certain in operation. All of the objections to itmostly its operation in freak cases, to tell the truth-can be eliminated
by a few simple modifications of the common-law rule. These would
be non-controversial and easy to enforce. A simple solution of a
problem whose scope has been greatly exaggerated.
Instead, Pennsylvania has rushed blindly into legislation, to me
unsound in theory, certainly wholly alien to the common-law concept,
incomprehensible, unpredictable. Very sad. I hope we here may do
something about it before it is too late. And you from other stateswhen some enthusiast starts a great hurrah for this new-fangled
legislation, I hope you will at least adjure your brothers to think the
matter over most prayerfully. Looking before leaping is much better
than waiting and seeing.

